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A CRITIQUE OF THE STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD FOR
DETERMINING CHILD SUPPORT IN CASES OF MALE VICTIMS
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND STATUTORY RAPE
ELLEN LONDON†
INTRODUCTION
S.F. also contends that he did not have consensual intercourse with T.M.
and that he was a victim of a sexual assault by T.M. . . . We note that S.F.
does not contest that he is the biological father of T.M.’s child.  A father
has both a legal and moral duty to support his minor children.
1
Victims have rights.  Here, the victim also has responsibilities.
A 34-year-old woman seduces a 15-year-old boy and becomes preg-
nant.  She gives birth to a daughter and thereafter applies for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children.  Is the child’s father obligated to pay
child support even though he is a victim of statutory rape?
2
So long as a man engages in an intimate sexual act resulting in his depos-
iting of his sperm with a woman who then becomes pregnant, he is liable
for child support.
3
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1
S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
2
County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 843 (Ct. App.
1996) (citation omitted).
3
Laura W. Morgan, It’s Ten O’Clock:  Do You Know Where Your Sperm Are?  Toward a
Strict Liability Theory of Parentage, 11 DIVORCE LITIG. 1, 7 (1999), available at http://
www.childsupportguidelines.com/articles/art199903.html.
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As illustrated by the above quotes, U.S. courts use strict liability as
the standard for determining child support liability in the case of un-
married parents.  The man or woman legally required to make pay-
ments each month is the one biologically linked to the child, with no
weight given to the existence of any social, psychological, emotional,
or other ties between them.  Courts give no consideration to the cir-
cumstances leading up to or involved in that biological connection,
and they do not require consent to the sexual relation.  That account-
able person is almost always the father, and with the common use of
DNA testing, it is practically impossible for a man to deny biological
paternity.4  While there are good arguments for a bright-line rule
(e.g., simplification of the process of securing child support for single
mothers), the use of strict liability has problematic implications for
societal conceptions of gender.  This rigid legal standard is justified by
traditional notions of aggressive men, weak women, and the nuclear,
heterosexual family.  The discourse employed by the courts denies
male victimization and ensures that women remain subordinate in the
                                                          
4
Jenny Skoble, No:  Biology Shouldn’t Always Be Considered as Destiny in Child-Support
Cases, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, May 6, 2002, at  http://www.insightmag.com/news/
249708.html.  Jenny Skoble notes that such testing is routine and reliable:
Since the early 1990s, DNA testing for paternity has been in widespread use
across the country.  These tests are highly accurate and now can be done
without even having to draw blood.  In the ‘buccal-swab’ method, saliva is
taken from a subject’s mouth with a cotton swab.  In many states, these tests
are performed routinely in the offices of the state’s child-support agency.
Id.  In one year, the Los Angeles County Child Support Services Department “estab-
lished paternity for more than 65,000 children, and distributed over $428 million dol-
lars for families.”  L.A. County Child Support Serv. Dep’t, Homepage, at  http://
childsupport.co.la.ca.us (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).  States authorize paternity tests in
cases involving dispute on the part of one of the alleged parents, and the parties are
required by the court to submit to the testing.  Law Offices of Aaron Dishon, Pater-
nityNet.com, California Paternity Actions, at  http://www.paternitynet.com/art08.
html (last modified Nov. 13, 2003).  For example, in Arkansas, the trial court must
order
the putative father, mother, and child to submit to scientific testing for pater-
nity, which may include deoxyribonucleic acid testing, to determine whether
or not the putative father can be excluded as being the biological father of the
child and to establish the probability of paternity if the testing does not ex-
clude the putative father.
. . . .
If the results of the paternity tests establish a ninety-five-percent or more
probability of inclusion that the putative father is the biological father of the
child, after corroborating testimony of the mother in regard to access during
the probable period of conception, it shall constitute a prima facie case of es-
tablishment of paternity, and the burden of proof shall shift to the putative fa-
ther to rebut such proof.
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-108(a)(1) & (6)(A) (Michie 2002).
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traditional hierarchy, and the underlying assumption of such dis-
course is that men are responsible for their sexuality, or that they have
agency,5 in a way that women do not.  The purported “best interests of
the child” objective of this strict liability standard6 is a simplistic phrase
employed uncritically by courts that do not want to involve themselves
in the dynamics of gender and sex in the cases before them.7  In this
                                                          
5
E.P. Thompson’s classic work The Making of the English Working Class is an exam-
ple of an early study based on the notion of “agency.”  E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING
OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1963).  Thompson argued that class consciousness
arose from working class individuals themselves rather than simply from external eco-
nomic factors.  He describes his book as follows:
This book has a clumsy title, but it is one which meets its purpose.  Making,
because it is a study in an active process, which owes as much to agency as to
conditioning.  The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed
time.  It was present at its own making.
  Id. at 9 (second emphasis added).
Laura Engelstein is another scholar who has examined this term, “agency,” and
her study is a useful point of analysis for this Comment.  She looks at prostitutes in
Russia at the turn of the century, exploring the complex interaction of legal regula-
tions and gender.  The Russian laws may be compared to the strict liability standard for
child support for male victims of sexual crimes.  She explains that the “laws regulating
sexual conduct cast such males . . . almost exclusively as culprits and women as victims,
granting men the privilege of agency that women were denied.”  LAURA ENGELSTEIN,
THE KEYS TO HAPPINESS:  SEX AND THE SEARCH FOR MODERNITY IN FIN-DE-SIÈCLE
RUSSIA 74 (1992).  Engelstein further writes that:
On the one hand, the continuing . . . restrictions on women’s right to sexual
self-determination reflected the lawmakers’ desire to protect them from the
abuse of power and authority to which they were subject in the domestic and
sexual realm.  On the other hand, the reluctance to acknowledge their sexual
agency kept them in the position of subordination that had established that
very vulnerability in the first place.
Id. at 75.
6
See, e.g., S.F. v. State ex rel  T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (de-
scribing the interests of the child as being paramount to any other parties’ concerns);
Hamm v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 985 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Ark. 1999) (up-
holding the trial court’s consideration of the “children’s best interests” in ruling
against a male victim of sexual misconduct); Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844-45
(holding that the state’s interest in protecting children outweighs the defendant’s
claims of victimization); State v. Daniel G.H. (In re  Paternity of Derek S.H.), 2002 WI
App 85, ¶ 11 (per curiam), 642 N.W.2d 645 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (unpublished table
decision) (“The paramount goal of any child support decision is to secure the best
interests of the child.”).
7
The work of feminist historian Joan Wallach Scott is helpful in distinguishing
between the terms “gender” and “sex.”  JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE
POLITICS OF HISTORY 32 (1999).  She maintains that sexual (biological) difference
between men and women is distinct from gender:  “Gender is . . . a social category
imposed on a sexed body.”  Id.  The categories of gender and sex often overlap in the
process of analysis, but as I explore in this Comment, the courts in the cases examined
often conflate the two.  Specifically, the courts often impose their own gendered no-
tions of masculinity upon male victims, regardless of who may be the male victim.
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Comment, I argue that strict liability is an inappropriate standard to
use, illustrated by an analysis of two cases involving male victims of
statutory rape and sexual assault.  Before examining these cases, I
briefly discuss why scholars and policymakers should engage this issue.
I also argue that feminists,8 in particular, should be challenging this
use of strict liability.
Much energy currently is being devoted to reproductive rights, es-
pecially as prochoice groups are fighting the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act9 in the federal courts.10  The Left is at a critical juncture, and,
in light of the enormous obstacles presented by this Act and its
supporters, a challenge to a child support standard, which brings
much-needed funding to single mothers and their children, appears
inconsequential or even offensive.11  This is the challenge taken up by
                                                          
8
I will be using the term “feminist” throughout this Comment to mean any per-
son who is invested in contesting and rethinking traditional gender relationships.
9
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1531.  The term “partial-
birth abortion” is generally objectionable to prochoice advocates.  Melissa C. Hol-
singer, Note, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003:  The Congressional Reaction to
Stenberg v. Carhart, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 603, 603 n.4 (2003).  In fact, two
later bills, Late Term Abortion Ban Act of 2003, H.R. 679, 108th Cong. (2003); Late
Term Abortion Restriction Act of 2003, H.R. 809, 108th Cong. (2003), were introduced
in Congress and omitted the use of the partial-birth language entirely.  Holsinger, su-
pra at 608 n.46.  The two terms, “partial-birth abortion” and “late-term abortion,” are
interchangeable.
10
See  Jonathan Groner, Challengers to Abortion Law Rally Around the Precedent, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at 3 (discussing the legal strategy of prochoice groups in federal
court battles over the partial-birth abortion ban); see also Bush Signs Late-Term Abortion
Law, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2003, at 8 (reporting an injunction by a Nebraska district court
judge against the partial-birth abortion law); John M. Glionna, Another Judge Rules
Against New Abortion Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003, at A31 (describing an injunction by
a California district court judge); Susan Saulny, Court Blocks New Statute that Limits Abor-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003, at A18 (describing a similar ruling in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York).  In response to the lawsuits following the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act, the Justice Department subpoenaed medical records of women who had abortions
in several major hospitals, sparking renewed controversy over the privacy rights of
these women.  See The Hunt for Abortion Records, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 2004, at 14 (assert-
ing that the gathering of abortion records was “an overzealous defense of a flawed
law”); Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Defends Subpoenas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A27
(quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft as saying, “we need to look at medical rec-
ords to find out if indeed there was medical necessity” for the challenged abortions);
Medical Privacy Falls Victim to Fierce Abortion Fight, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2004, at 8A
(characterizing the subpoenas as a “chilling threat[] to medical privacy”).  But see  Eric
Lichtblau, Justice Department Backs Off Its Demand for Abortion Records, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2004, at A20 (describing the actions of the Justice Department in dropping some of
its demands for medical records on abortions).
11
It would be wrong to ignore these deeply rooted problems underlying the sup-
port for a strict liability standard.  See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction
of Families Without Fathers:  Is It an Option for Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 375, 376 (1996) (noting that in constructing her arguments for families
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feminist scholars and activists Wendy Brown and Janet Halley in their
collaborative collection entitled Left Legalism/Left Critique.12  They ar-
gue that critiquing leftist projects is not only necessary, but is also em-
powering in that it paves the way for innovative thinking and coalition-
building, even at a time when important rights are at stake.13  Brown
and Halley assert that the very process of critique is valuable, in part
because it offers a way to analyze our present discourses, structures of
power, political choices, and the sources of such choices.14  It also “in-
vites us to dissect our most established maxims and shibboleths, not
only for scholastic purposes, but also for the deeply political ones of
renewing perspective and opening new possibility.”15
Thus, scholars and policymakers must not be paralyzed by the de-
bate over abortion.  In fact, the encroachments on, and threats to, re-
productive freedom are added reasons to engage in critique, to reex-
amine the discourses that they employ, and as in the child support
cases involving male victims, to question even those laws that may
at first glance appear liberal,16 and even feminist.17  This is a historic
moment in which the hegemony of many traditional norms related
to gender, sex, and the family is being highly contested,18 and leftist
                                                                                                                                
without fathers, she must acknowledge “a larger social context of male indifference to
the consequences of sexual intercourse and male irresponsibility for the economic
well-being of the children they sire”).
12
LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
13
See  Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction to LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE
supra  note 12, at 29 (“[E]ven as critique brings out the tensions, problems, or binds in
a particular political formation, it also has the capacity to reconnect us to our aims and
hopes . . . .”).
14
See id. at 26-27 (“Critique is . . . a practice that allows us to scrutinize the form,
content, and possible reworking of our apparent political choices.”).
15
Id. at 27.
16
See, e.g., JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA:  PRACTICAL ADVICE
FOR NEGOTIATING—AND COLLECTING—A FAIR SETTLEMENT, at ix (1986) (“Child sup-
port in America is a national disgrace.  There is no more widespread and profoundly
consequential example of lawlessness in our society today than fathers’ refusal to care
for their children after divorce.”).  Joseph Lieberman wrote Child Support in America
while he was the attorney general of Connecticut, and he observed firsthand many of
the issues associated with collecting child support.  Id. at ix-x.  He concluded that “the
failure of delinquent fathers to pay child support is the major reason why more than
half the American families that are headed by a woman live below the poverty level.”
Id. at x.
17
See id. at 9 (describing how child support enforcement was taken up as a politi-
cal cause by women’s groups).
18
While reproductive rights are at a critical juncture, the institution of marriage is
similarly at a political crossroads.  The gay rights movement won a decisive victory in
the recent Lawrence v. Texas decision, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003)
(holding that a Texas statute criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), and many people are now wondering
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activists have a unique opportunity to advocate for changes in long-
held beliefs and institutions.
Cases of male victims of sexual crimes who are required to pay
child support may seem an odd choice for analysis and critique.
These cases are not, however, simply aberrations within family law.
Rather, these seemingly extreme situations are “border cases” 19 that
illuminate broader legal issues involving gender and sexuality.  In
these cases—as opposed to those raising issues such as misrepresenta-
tions regarding birth control20—the facts present clear, bodily invasion
                                                                                                                                
what will happen next not only for lesbian and gay couples, but for marriage and the
traditional family in general.  The Goodridge decision and other developments brought
the issue of gay marriage to national prominence and increased debate.  See Goodridge
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that same-sex mar-
riage could not be denied under the Massachusetts constitution).  Compare  Opinions of
the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (concluding that a state
civil union bill would not meet state constitutional requirements because it would not
give same-sex couples full marriage rights), and Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Judge
Rules Gay Marriages Can Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at A8 (reporting the view
of some observers that the marriage license debate “was becoming more rooted in
legal, not political, ground[s]”), with Michael Martinez, N.M. Halts Brief Run of Same-Sex
Marriages, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 2004, at C1 (reporting New Mexico attorney general’s
issuing of an advisory opinion against same-sex marriages), Elizabeth Mehren, Same-Sex
Marriage Divides Mass, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2004, at A9 (describing sharply polarized
legislative debate on the issue of same-sex marriage), James W. Pindell & Yvonne
Abraham, N.H. Bill Targets Same-Sex Marriage:  Effects to be Sweeping, Gay Advocates Cau-
tion, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2004, at B1 (describing proposed legislation in New
Hampshire that would refuse to recognize same-sex unions or marriages permitted in
other states), and Wedding Zinger:  Marriage Amendment Faces Fight, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19,
2004, at 11 (opining that a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriages would
be difficult to pass and “[t]hat’s what the Founding Fathers intended”).
19
See  Rachel Bowlby, Book Review, 9 TULSA STUD. IN WOMEN’S LITERATURE 314,
314 (1990) (reviewing MARY POOVEY, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENTS:  THE IDEOLOGICAL
WORK OF GENDER IN MID-VICTORIAN ENGLAND (1988), and describing Poovey’s use of
“border cases” in her study of sexual and social norms in Victorian England).  Rachel
Bowlby claims that these border cases “are interesting for the ways in which they chal-
lenge or fail to fit prevailing sexual and social norms and thus by their oddness show
up the limits and contradictions of those norms.”  Id.
20
In a series of cases, each father argued that he should not have to pay child sup-
port to a mother who lied to him about her use of contraception or her ability to get
pregnant.  Courts uniformly reject such claims by fathers.  See, e.g., Stephen K. v. Roni
L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620 (Ct. App. 1980) (It “is nothing more than asking the court
to supervise the promises made between two consenting adults as to the circumstances
of their private sexual conduct.  To do so would encourage unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters affecting the individual’s right to privacy”); Hur v. Virginia Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. Div. of Child Support Enforcement, 409 S.E.2d 454, 457-58 (Va. Ct. App.
1991) (rejecting the father’s argument that the mother was liable to him for infliction
of emotional harm because “[t]he evidence sufficiently demonstrated that [the father]
voluntarily engaged in sexual relations with [the mother]”); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687
P.2d 223, 227 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (“Nothing in [the applicable child support stat-
ute] permits parents in an action brought thereunder to litigate the issue of whether
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and lack of consent on the part of the male victim.  Scholars of gender
and sexuality will hopefully lay the groundwork for further analysis of
the less clear cases.
Some people, namely the so-called fathers’ rights groups, do not
consider these border cases to be marginal in the least.21  These
groups claim that men are treated unfairly in the family law context
and that many of the current regulations (such as child support de-
terminations) are unreasonable.22  The fathers’ rights groups are in-
teresting in the context of this Comment, as many of the organizations
present an alternative image to the “deadbeat dad”; these groups as-
sert a more nuanced version of masculinity that encompasses themes
of equal responsibility and care for children.  For example, the Ameri-
can Coalition of Fathers and Children maintains that “through our
involvement and dedication, we can have a positive effect on the emo-
tional and psychological well-being of children.”23  The arguments
made by these groups are simplistic and often antifeminist and overly
hostile,24 but they represent a viewpoint largely ignored by both the
                                                                                                                                
or not they in fact wanted the child.”).  See generally  Morgan, supra  note 3 (citing these
and several similar cases in state courts).
21
For example, the National Center for Men’s Voluntary Fatherhood Project discusses
the “highly discriminatory” nature of current paternity laws.  National Center for Men,
Voluntary Fatherhood Project, Homepage, at http://www.nas.com/c4m (last visited Apr.
30, 2004).  The group’s stated goal is “fostering a dialog [sic] about reducing discrimi-
nation and out of wedlock births.”  Id.  For other internet sites of a similar theme, see
A-Team, Homepage, at http://www.a-team.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2004); American
Fathers Coalition, Homepage, at http://users.erols.com/afc (last visited Feb. 27, 2004);
Fathers’ Rights & Equality Exchange, Homepage, at http://www.dadsrights.org/index1
.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2004); Fatherhood Coalition, PROTEST:  The War on Father-
hood, at http://www.fatherhoodcoalition.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
22
See, e.g., Alliance for Non-Custodial Parents [sic] Rights, Family Law—Child Sup-
port—Father’s Rights, at http://www.ancpr.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2004) (discussing
the “injustices in family court”).  One of the main themes of the fathers’ rights groups’
Web sites is anger over the lack of joint custody of children.  See, e.g., id. (“Fathers
are routinely discriminated against in family court.”).  But see Gloria Woods, “Father’s
Rights” Groups:  Beware Their Real Agenda, NATIONAL NOW TIMES (National Organiza-
tion for Women, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1997, http://www.now.org/nnt/03-97/
father.html (representing Michigan NOW and opposing forced joint custody as an
unrealistic and inadequate solution for women, children, and divorced families in gen-
eral).
23
American Coalition for Fathers and Children, Mission Statement, at http://www.
acfc.org/about.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
24
Many of the fathers’ rights groups advocate for changes that are highly prob-
lematic to women and feminists.  For example, Dads Against Discrimination pledges to
“preserve, protect, and defend the father headed family.”  Jeff Edwards, Dads Against
Discrimination, at http://www.menweb.org/throop/orgs/blurb/dads.html (last visited
Apr. 30, 2004) (emphasis omitted).  In its Family Court Report, the California National
Organization for Women found “an insidious, sexist, and dangerously powerful
1964 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 152: 1957
legal system and social critiques and are not entirely at odds with left-
ist goals.  These organizations also emphasize the broader point that
these cases involve issues of reproduction and the family that are
complex and political, as well as deeply personal, for both men and
women.
These cases also highlight the tremendous impact of the regula-
tory state and judicial decision making on the day-to-day details of a
person’s life.25  When a state involves itself in childrearing (or its fi-
nancing), it directly asserts its sometimes heavy-handed influence on
the family.  Specifically, the state implements guidelines for determin-
ing the exact amount of child support owed, a calculation requiring
the disclosure of an individual’s personal financial information.26  In
addition, a judge has the power to shape public perceptions of a sex-
ual or other personal encounter by the manner in which she conducts
a trial or writes an opinion.27  In analyzing these cases, it is clear that
the judicial presentation of the relationships involved is shaped by
                                                                                                                                
movement of men and women whose political agenda has been infused into judicial
procedure and process.”  SHEILA HEIM ET AL., CAL. NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, FAMILY
COURT REPORT 2002, at 19, available at http://www.canow.org/fam_report.pdf.  While
distinguishing the “backlash” groups from profeminist men’s groups, the report found
that the former engaged in such tactics as diverting funds from programs and services
like Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, women’s shelters, and other sources of
funding for female victims of abuse.  Id. at 20-21.  The fathers’ rights groups’ agenda,
according to the report, is “to avoid child support, impoverish women, and perpetuate
a patriarchal suprastructure by which women and children are subjugated to property
status.”  Id. at 23.
25
Brown and Halley discuss the often unseen role of legal regulation in life, not-
ing that the “law is capable of intensely intimate effects.”  Brown & Halley, supra  note
13, at 14.
26
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320 app. § 20 (West Supp. 2003) (“The
court shall make findings in the record as to:  Gross Income, Adjusted Gross Income,
Basic Child Support Obligation, Total Child Support Obligation, each parent’s propor-
tionate share of the child support obligation, and the child support order.”).  Each
state utilizes guidelines in determining child support award amounts that are based on
directives from Congress, and any deviation from the guidelines must be backed by a
written justification.  Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policy, in
CHILD SUPPORT:  THE NEXT FRONTIER 16, 17 ( J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli
eds., 2000).
27
Note, specifically, the power of the trial judge.  In Daniel G.H., the appellate
judge pointed out that the “determination of appropriate child support is committed
to the trial court’s sound discretion.”  State v. Daniel G.H. (In re  Paternity of Derek
S.H.), 2002 WI App 85U, ¶ 9 (per curiam), 642 N.W.2d 645 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (un-
published table decision).  In this case, the trial court allowed the issue of nonconsent
(the father was sexually assaulted) to go to the jury, yet when the jury found that the
sexual intercourse was in fact involuntary, the judge still found that the child’s interest
in receiving support from both parents was the deciding factor.  The trial court thus
found no reason to deviate from the “percentage of income” standard for determining
how much child support would be required.  Id. at *2, *4.
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individuals’ gendered assumptions, and it is equally clear that judges
may not be aware of their own use of gendered discourse.  In deter-
mining child support liability, the court essentially dictates the mean-
ing of the initial sexual connection, delineating the legal definition of
sexual agency that individuals have vis-à-vis their partners.  As Brown
and Halley conclude, “law and the state are . . . importantly productive
of identity and subjectivity.”28
These questions and problems address just one aspect of an entire
system in need of examination.  The issues of strict liability and child
support in cases of statutory rape and sexual assault are deeply con-
nected to an ever-increasing array of questions arising in the context
of new reproductive technologies.29  While many of these questions
are beyond the scope of this Comment, Part III will provide sugges-
tions, applicable beyond the two cases examined below, for a more
critical approach to the issues related to childrearing and the family.
In Part I of this Comment, I present the current legal situation re-
garding child support and describe how this situation plays out in two
different cases.  In Part II, I critique this legal standard, using ideas
from feminist writers and masculinity studies.  Finally, in Part III, I
present some suggestions, possibilities, and hopes for the future.  In
doing so, however, I keep in mind the following assertion by Brown
and Halley:  The “aim of critique is to reveal subterranean structures
or aspects of a particular discourse, not necessarily to reveal the truth
                                                          
28
Brown & Halley, supra  note 13, at 7.  Brown and Halley point out that one of
the dangers of our legalized system is that we forget that legal regulations (rather than
just “culture” or “society”) also profoundly impact individual perceptions and identi-
ties.  See id. at 13 (“Because law can take the shape of permissions rather than prohibi-
tions, it can invisibly capacitate social and cultural actors to do particular kinds of so-
cial and cultural work.”).  Scott also discusses the role of law and of politics in creating
definitions of gender.  SCOTT, supra  note 7, at 41-50 (encouraging historians to recon-
sider political and legal questions in terms of gender and power as both constitutive of
and resulting from social relationships).
29
See, e.g., Dion Farquhar, Reproductive Technologies Are Here to Stay, SOJOURNER,
Jan. 1995, at 5, 6, available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/rt21/procreative/
Farquhar.htm (“The question of whether reproductive technologies benefit or harm
their users, providers, and society as a whole has become an important element of con-
temporary feminist debate.”); see also Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies
and the Pregnancy Process:  Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25
AM. J.L. & MED. 455, 456 (1999) (suggesting that “current disputes over the disposition
of frozen embryos” will “grow increasingly fierce and complicated”); Adam P. Plant,
With a Little Help from My Friends:  The Intersection of the Gestational Carrier Surrogacy Agree-
ment, Legislative Inaction, and Medical Advancement, 54 ALA. L. REV. 639 (2003) (discuss-
ing the laws’ ability to relate to the emerging practice of gestational carriers).
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of or about that discourse.  What critique promises is not objectivity
but perspective . . . .”30
I.  THE CURRENT SITUATION:  A STRICT LIABILITY THEORY OF SPERM
Child support has “come of age.”31  Once the “stepchild” of family
law, it is now central in discussions and regulations of the family.32
June Carbone traces the change in child support policy from its previ-
ous emphasis on marriage to its current emphasis on the parent-child
relationship.33  Child support began in England several hundred years
ago both as a penalty for those who violated social custom and as a way
to offset public expense.34  The advent of state aid to dependent chil-
dren—and the subsequent federal version in 193535—brought further
moral policing as the states were given the discretion to exclude non-
marital children.36  This changed in the 1960s when barriers to these
children were deemed invalid.37  With more children eligible for child
support, Congress shifted its focus to finding fathers and enforcing
individual support obligations.  As part of this effort, in 1975 Congress
set up the Office of Child Support Enforcement,38 and those individu-
als seeking funds from Aid to Families with Dependent Children
                                                          
30
Brown & Halley, supra note 13, at 26.  The use of discourse analysis may be
traced to Michel Foucault.  His scholarship has become a dominant form of contem-
porary cultural analysis.  1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert
Hurley trans., Random House 1978) (1976).  Joan Scott also emphasizes the centrality
of language in looking at gender.  She writes that “words, like the ideas and things they
are meant to signify, have a history.”  SCOTT, supra  note 7, at 28.
31
June Carbone, Child Support Comes of Age:  An Introduction to the Law of Child Sup-
port, in CHILD SUPPORT:  THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 26.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 4.
34
Id. at 4-5.
35  See Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 401–406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-629 (1935) (repealed 1996)
(setting aside reimbursement funds to assist needy, dependent children).  The AFDC
program (originally entitled Aid to Dependent Children) was included in Title IV of
the Social Security Act of 1935.  Id.  The program established a system of reimburse-
ment of state funds voluntarily spent on providing support for children.
36
See Carbone, supra note 31, at 8 (“Congress envisioned the program as a tempo-
rary federal assumption of state efforts to provide for children whose fathers had died,
and it permitted each state to impose ‘such other eligibility requirements—as to
means, moral character, etc.—it sees fit.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 615, at 24 (1935); S.
REP. NO. 628, at 36 (1935)).
37
See id. (“By the 1960s . . . the federal agency charged with administration of the
program disapproved of barriers to aid based on illegitimacy alone . . . .”).
38 See  Child Support Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–669 (1975) (creating the
Child Support Enforcement program under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act).
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(AFDC)39 had to cooperate in locating absent parents and obtaining
support payments as a prerequisite for receiving funds.40
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was growing concern re-
garding the lack of child support being paid and the accompanying
effects that such delinquency had on children.41  In response to this
concern, Congress passed the Family Support Act of 198842 (com-
monly called the Child Support Act), requiring states to establish, im-
prove, and more actively enforce their child support systems.43  The
modern system, brought about by the Child Support Act, is different
from previous approaches in that the duty to provide child support is
not only treated more seriously, but—and vital to note—is a require-
ment separate from other family obligations, such as marriage.44  This
change came about in response to rising divorce rates and rising
numbers of single-parent families;45 policymakers realized that par-
enthood is a more stable hook on which to hang support obligations
than is the marital relationship.46
Not only do state child support guidelines now focus on the
parent-child relationship rather than on marital status, but the guide-
lines also focus exclusively on the parent’s biological relationship to
the child.47  Laura Wish Morgan writes about how this biological
                                                          
39
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1969) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–619 (2000)), “ended
the federal entitlement to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and re-
placed it with block grants to states, thereby shifting the major responsibility for help-
ing poor families to state and local governments.”  This new program, Temporary As-
sistance to Needy Families (TANF), supplanted the AFDC program and made funding
contingent on the applicant’s efforts to find or prepare for employment.  Paul K. Le-
gler, The Impact of Welfare Reform on the Child Support Enforcement System, in CHILD
SUPPORT:  THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 26, at 46.
40
Legler, supra note 39.
41
See id. at 9 (describing the “declining well-being of American children”).
42
Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (2000)).
43
See  Carbone, supra note 31, at 9-10 (describing the states’ obligations established
by the Family Support Act of 1988).
44
Id. at 10.
45
Id. at 10-11.
46  Id.
47
Courts that have the power to determine child support obligations find that, if
certain physical requirements are satisfied, the judicial role is simply to determine the
amount to be paid; the context of the conception need not be examined.  For exam-
ple, in Illinois:
If the child was born out of wedlock and the case is subject to the voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity or the administrative determination of pater-
nity under rules established under Section 10-17.7, the Child and Spouse
Support Unit of the Illinois Department shall determine the child support
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connection is played out in various scenarios, and she finds that—
regardless of the context—the father is uniformly held responsible by
courts for his child support obligations.48  Morgan begins her discus-
sion examining cases in which the mother made misrepresentations
regarding her use of birth control or her ability to get pregnant, ex-
plaining that such misrepresentations have never been a viable de-
fense to the father of the child.49  Morgan also examines cases in
which the man did not engage in sexual intercourse, namely, cases in
which a man provided sperm to a woman for artificial insemination
with the express agreement that he would not be liable for supporting
the child.50  Here as well, the courts held that—if the parties did not
comply with local statutes governing artificial insemination—“a
mother simply cannot waive child support on behalf of the child and
the father cannot waive his parental rights” on grounds of public pol-
icy.51  In an even more extreme example, Morgan describes a case in
which a woman offered to perform oral sex on a man (who wore a
condom) and then subsequently removed the condom and used it to
inseminate herself with the man’s sperm.52  Once again, the court
found that because this man was the father of the woman’s child, he
was liable for child support payments.53  Morgan also analyzes cases
of pregnancy resulting from incidents of sexual assault and statutory
rape.54  In her discussion, Morgan examines instances of male victims of
statutory rape who are “legally incapable of ‘intending’ to have sexual
intercourse” due to their underage status,55 but who are nonetheless
                                                                                                                                
obligation under subsection (b) of Section 10-7 upon establishing the child’s
paternity.
305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-6 (2001).  As described in Morgan’s article, the courts have
enforced this duty as though the paternity determination leads to strict liability for
child support.  See generally Morgan, supra  note 3, at 4-9 (discussing various cases of
strict liability child support despite possible tort liability, statutory rape, artificial in-
semination on the part of the mother, and lack of consent or intent by the father).
48
See Morgan, supra  note 3, at 4-9 (concluding that, “[i]f a man intends to have
sexual intercourse with a woman and a baby results, the man is liable for child sup-
port”).
49 Id.  In these cases, fathers have unsuccessfully put forth legal defenses using the
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
equal protection, and tort liability for fraud and misrepresentation.  Id.
50
Id. at 5-6.
51
Id. at 6.
52
Id. at 7 (“[B]ecause the father intentionally engaged in a sexual act resulting in
his deposit of sperm with the mother, he was liable for child support.” (citing State v.
Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1997))).
53
Frisard, 694 So. 2d at 1034.
54  Morgan, supra  note 3, at 5.
55
Id.
2004] STRICT LIABILITY OF CHILD SUPPORT 1969
held strictly liable under child support regulations.56  Morgan also ex-
amines a case in which a man who was unconscious during sexual in-
tercourse was nonetheless found to be liable for child support.57  Al-
though both of these cases will be analyzed in greater detail below, it is
already clear why Morgan has coined the legal policy in such cases a
“strict liability theory of sperm.”58
A.  The Cases of  Nathaniel J. and S.F.
Although, as Morgan demonstrates, this strict liability theory is
played out in many contexts, two exemplary cases illustrate this theory
in action—County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J.59 and S.F. v. State ex
rel. T.M.60  Both cases illustrate the imposition of the strict liability
theory in particularly disturbing ways,61 and both involve sexual crimes
on the part of the mother.  The first case, Nathaniel J., was initiated by
the county as a paternity action to recover child support for a child
born to Nathaniel J. and a woman named Ricci Jones.62  Jones was 34
when she had sexual intercourse with Nathaniel J., then aged 15.63
Although Jones was convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a
minor,64 the district attorney sought child support and welfare reim-
bursement from Nathaniel J.65  As a defense against the child support
request, Nathaniel J. invoked his status as a statutory rape victim,
claiming that both public policy against sexual exploitation and his
                                                          
56
See id. (discussing child support obligations in the context of male statutory
rape).
57
See id. at 7-8. (discussing S.F. v. State ex rel T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996), a case where the father claimed that he should not be responsible for child
support because the mother had sexual intercourse with him while he was intoxicated,
and he therefore could not have consented to intercourse).
58
See  Morgan, supra  note 3, at 8.
59
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Ct. App. 1996).
60
695 So. 2d 1186 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
61
There are many arguments regarding strict liability and efficiency.  In this
Comment, I am operating on the premise that the strict liability that results from the
courts’ consistent refusal to take into account male victimization as a defense against
child support liability is an overly rigid—and thus unfair—system that cannot be justi-
fied on efficiency grounds.  As will be discussed below, it is disturbing because it relies
on stereotypes and contributes to a traditional way of thinking about both men and
women.  In general, it is also troubling that such laws go unchallenged and that the
desire to avoid confronting complicated and emotional ideas carries so much weight.
62
Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844.
63
Id.
64
Id.  The mother was convicted under CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(d) (West 1999)
(laying out the elements of a statutory rape offense).
65
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844.
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right as a victim to restitution should relieve him of liability.66  The
court rejected Nathaniel J.’s argument, stating that the interest in pro-
viding equal support to the child from both of her parents outweighed
his various claims.67  The opinion noted that Nathaniel J. was not an
innocent victim because he and Jones decided together to begin en-
gaging in sexual intercourse, and they had intercourse “approximately
five times over a two week period.”68  The court distinguished those
crime victims who suffer injury through no fault of their own from
those who voluntarily engage in the offensive behavior:  “One who is
injured as a result of criminal conduct in which he willingly partici-
pated is not a typical crime victim.”69  Nathaniel J. apparently fell into
this latter category and was thus given an order to pay child support.70
S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M. involved a man who was not conscious dur-
ing a sexual encounter that led to pregnancy and who, therefore, did
not consent to the encounter.71  In 1992, S.F. was at a party at T.M.’s
house, after drinking at a club for several hours beforehand.  He
passed out and was put to bed by T.M. and his brother, fully clothed.
When S.F. woke up the next morning, he was only wearing his shirt
(unbuttoned).72  T.M. told a friend that she had sex with S.F. while he
was passed out and that he had “‘saved her a trip to the sperm
bank.’”73  A medical doctor testified at trial that a man who is uncon-
scious is physically capable of both erection and ejaculation because
these are not conscious, voluntary activities.74  There was a 99.47%
probability that S.F. was the father of T.M.’s child.75  Although S.F. ar-
gued that he should not be held liable for child support due to T.M.’s
sexual assault on him,76 the lower court ordered S.F. to pay $120 per
month in child support and $7,152.40 as child support arrearage, to
                                                          
66
Id.
67
Id. at 845.
68
Id. at 844.
69
Id. (citation omitted).
70
A similar case is that of State ex. rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan.
1993).  The trial judge in Hermesmann stated:  “It’s my view . . . that a minor may be
held legally liable to provide reimbursement to the State . . . and that the issues of con-
sent and the criminal case and so forth are not really relevant in a paternity proceed-
ing, which we’re talking about, civil liability to support a child.”  Id. at 1275 (quoting
the district judge).
71
695 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1188 (quoting T.M.).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1186.
76
Id. at 1188.
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include the child on his medical insurance, to pay one-half of any
medical expenses not covered by insurance, and to pay $300 for the
cost of the blood tests.77  The appellate court, in affirming the lower
court’s decision, looked at the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act78 and
ultimately held that the interests of the child are paramount to any
other party’s concerns.79  The court concluded that “any wrongful
conduct on the part of the mother should not alter the father’s duty
to provide support for the child.  We note that the father could have
filed criminal charges against the mother.”80  Judge Crawley, in his dis-
sent, argued that this was an unjust application of the rules, noting
that S.F. “never wanted to have any children, and had always taken
precautions not to have children.”81  Crawley would not have denied
S.F. all liability; rather, he would have limited it solely to the amount
that T.M.’s income could not cover the child’s necessary expenses.82
In discussing T.M. (a “licentious opportunist”), he noted that the
“mother’s ingenuity strongly indicates her ability to earn an adequate
living for herself and her child.”83
                                                          
77
Id. at 1186-87.
78
ALA. CODE § 26-17-1 to -22 (1992 & Supp. 2002).
79
695 So. 2d at 1189.  The S.F. court argued that, “[u]nder the [Uniform Parent-
age Act], the interests of the illegitimate child are deemed to be paramount to those of
the other parties to the proceeding.  The interests of the other parties are not com-
pletely discounted, but merely subordinated to those of the child.”  Id. at 1189 (quot-
ing Carlotta P. Wells, Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Paternity Proceedings:  Barring an
“Illegitimate’s” Right to Support, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 612 (1983)).  Several other states
have passed legislation with similar priorities, including the Maryland code that says
The purpose of this subtitle is (1) to promote the general welfare and best in-
terests of children born out of wedlock by securing for them, as nearly as prac-
ticable, the same rights to support, care, and education as children born in
wedlock; (2) to impose on the mothers and fathers of children born out of
wedlock the basic obligations and responsibilities of parenthood; and (3) to
simplify the procedures for determining paternity, custody, guardianship, and
responsibility for the support of children born out of wedlock.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1002(b) (1999); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §
1653(3) (West Supp. 2003) (“The court, in making an award of parental rights and
responsibilities with respect to a child, shall apply the standard of the best interest of
the child.”).
80
695 So. 2d at 1189 (citation omitted).
81
Id. at 1191 (Crawley, J., dissenting in part).
82
Id.  (“The child’s best interest is paramount.  We cannot, without consideration
of the mother’s ability to support the child, deny her all relief requested.”).
83
Id.  A very similar (and more recent) case is State v. Daniel G.H. (In re Paternity of
Derek S.H.), 2002 WI App 85 (per curiam), 642 N.W.2d 645 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (un-
published table decision).  Daniel denied paternity against the claims of Jennifer, the
mother, (and the state of Wisconsin) on the grounds that he did not consent to sex
with Jennifer.  Id. ¶ 2.  At trial, the jury found that the sex was indeed involuntary (al-
though the jury did not find that he had been given a date rape drug, as he claimed).
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II.  CRITIQUING THE STRICT LIABILITY THEORY OF SPERM
In many of the cases that Morgan identified, the fathers argued
that there was inherent unfairness due to the fact that only the mother
could decide whether to bear the child.84  To this argument Morgan
responds that “what the men have failed to understand is that in all of
these cases, the women assumed not only all the ‘reproduction rights,’
they assumed the reproduction risks of the failure of birth control.”85
Due to biological differences, a man’s reproductive choice happens
“in the bedroom and not at the abortion clinic or the courtroom.”86
Morgan’s final piece of advice to those men who do not want to pay
child support for a child they did not plan for or desire is to “[s]hut
up and put on a condom.”87  Her comment reflects the underlying
attitude of the strict liability standard, namely the law’s limited abil-
ity to take gender and sexual agency into account in a nuanced and
effective way.  Both the Nathaniel J. and S.F. courts were unable
and/or unwilling to acknowledge that the victims involved were
particularly affected due to the fact that they were male.  The tradi-
tional conceptions of power, dominance, and victimization em-
ployed by these courts precluded the judges from providing the de-
fendants with a fair or adequate solution.  Little doubt exists that the
judges in these cases would have written different opinions if the vic-
tims were female—illuminating how men are viewed as the responsi-
ble party in a sexual encounter and women have no corresponding
agency.88  Neither decision discusses the various gender dynamics in-
volved, let alone a concern for gender inequity.  Nonetheless, gender
                                                                                                                                
Id. ¶ 5.  Daniel was nonetheless ordered to make child support payments.  Id. ¶ 6.  The
reviewing court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving more
weight to the child’s interest in having support from two parents than to Daniel’s lack
of consent.  Id. ¶ 12.
84
Supra  notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
85
Morgan, supra  note 3, at 8.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 9.
88
In fact, many states have statutes that terminate or limit paternal rights when a
child is conceived as a result of female sexual victimization.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 728(d) (1999) (denying the biological father visitation privileges “[i]f a child
is conceived and subsequently born as the result of an act of rape of any degree or
unlawful sexual intercourse, in either the first or second degree with the mother”); see
also  Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 540 n.22 (Del. 2000) (listing similar statutes
in fifteen other states).  While biological differences prevent an exact analogy, it is still
clear that male perpetrators both are actively punished and are kept from their chil-
dren, whereas in the cases presented in this Comment of female perpetrators, the of-
fenders do not appear to suffer adverse consequences from their actions.
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stereotypes89 lurk in the background of both opinions:  the courts not
only upheld notions of traditional masculinity even when directly faced
with male victims, but also deprived the mothers of any real power by
portraying them as devious, manipulative, or, simply put, pathetic.90
Morgan’s advice to wear a condom clearly would not have helped
S.F. or any man in his situation.91  As a result of the prevailing strict
liability standard, judges in this case and others do not have to deal
with the idea of a male victim of sexual assault by a woman because
they are free to focus instead on the paramount interest of the child.
This does not change the fact, however, that a male victim is present
in S.F., an issue separate and distinct from the interests of his child.
As for S.F.’s claims of sexual assault, the opinion stated simply that S.F.
could have filed criminal charges against the mother.92  By severing
the live child from the act of conception, the court can require child
support from the male victim without ever addressing whether the
man was deceived or even abused.  This reasoning shifts the analysis
temporally from conception to the moment of, and the time after,
childbirth.  Implicit in the court’s opinion is the idea that its proceed-
ings are simply generating monetary support for a child rather than
inflicting any emotional damage on either party, and the judicially
imposed payment of such money thus should not be viewed as pun-
ishment for the male victim.
Notions of male power and the preservation of the gender/sex
status quo are especially visible in the S.F. dissent.  Judge Crawley
found T.M. distasteful, and in light of her brazenness, was careful to
maintain the masculinity of S.F., despite S.F.’s status as “victim.”  He
mentioned that S.F. was “37 years old, never wanted to have any chil-
dren, and had always taken precautions not to have children.”93  Judge
Crawley portrayed S.F. as a man who was, before T.M. appeared, in
control of his life.  He described T.M.’s conduct as “reprehensible”
(and mentioned that her action that night was a misdemeanor), which
should have been sufficient reason for the trial court to deviate from
                                                          
89
See generally  SCOTT, supra  note 7, at 31-50 (explaining the necessity of discourse
analysis, even when gender stereotypes are not overtly expressed, and the importance
of reading gender into language).
90  Supra  Part I.A.
91
Even Morgan is bothered by the outcome in this case:  she writes that the “les-
son one must take from S.F. v. T.M. . . . is somewhat troubling.”  Morgan, supra  note 3,
at 10.
92
S.F. v. State ex rel  T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
93
Id. at 1191 (Crawley, J., dissenting in part).
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the child support guidelines.94  He opined (snidely) that the mother’s
“ingenuity” indicates that she should be perfectly capable of procuring
money for herself and her child and that “[t]hose who acknowledge
President George Washington as the ‘father of our country’ can
breathe a sigh of relief that this licentious opportunist did not fall into
Rip Van Winkle’s forest bed.”95  In an effort to sexualize T.M., he men-
tioned in a footnote that there was evidence that she had attended a
party dressed as a condom.96  This portrayal implied that she was ma-
nipulative in her use of sex.  In so doing, the judge reinforced two
overlapping gender stereotypes:  that of the strong, independent man
and that of the devious woman who manipulates power structures
through her (overdeveloped) sexuality.97
This portrayal of gender relations takes on a slightly different
form in cases of male victims of statutory rape, but the gender stereo-
types underlying these cases are similarly destructive to both men and
women.  Ruth Jones explains that statutory rape laws were drafted—
and are enforced—in light of the female experience.98  These laws,
thus, do not adequately take into account the unique problems faced
by male victims.99  Specifically, they do not acknowledge that “male
                                                          
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1191 n.1.
97
See  FOUCAULT, supra  note 30, at 104 (describing the three-part process in which
the female body was “analyzed . . . as being thoroughly saturated with sexuality”; inte-
grated into medical science; and then placed into the family sphere, highlighting the
“[m]other, with her negative image of ‘nervous woman’” as the most obvious example
of hysterization of women).
98 Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws:  Why Must Male Victims of Statutory
Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting from Their Victimization?, 36 GA. L. REV. 411,
419 (2002).  While analyzing the way that the law ignores male victims, it is also useful
to ask the following question:  If statutory rape law is based on and enforced only in
the case of women, what does this then imply about women?  The implication is that
women—by serving in the role of the victim—are viewed as passive, weak, and in need
of protection.  The feminist debate over the use of the “reasonable woman standard”
also raises this question.  While proponents of such a gendered standard argue that
“sexualized conduct differentially harms women,” some feminists argue—amongst
other things—that “an explicitly gendered standard could end up backfiring and rein-
scribing Victorian notions of morality into Title VII law.”  MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRO-
DUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 241-45 (1999); see also ENGELSTEIN, supra note 5,
at 75 (explaining that the regulations of Russian prostitutes, supposedly a form of pro-
tection, actually maintained the subordinate and dependent position of these women
in civil society).  But cf. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) (accept-
ing California’s position that the legislature designed a non-gender-neutral statutory
rape statute to deter female pregnancy and declining to view this statute as “impermis-
sibly underinclusive”).
99
Jones notes that as compared to female victimization, male victimization “has
not been adequately studied.”  Jones, supra  note 98, at 439.
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victims should also be protected from the long-term, negative conse-
quences resulting from the financial obligations of fatherhood.”100
Although the Nathaniel J. court did not appear to view child support
payments as imposing any sort of long-lived, nonfinancial harm on
Nathaniel J.,101 Jones explicitly links child support payments to notions
of punishment and harm to male victims.102  Although scarce, existing
data on this subject indicates that men are negatively impacted by be-
ing victims of statutory rape103 and that becoming a father at a young
age affects all aspects of a young man’s life, from emotional develop-
ment to educational and career opportunities.104  In this way, then,
“[c]ourts have failed to recognize that the financial obligation for a
child is one of the consequences of male victimization.”105
Jones analyzes the failings of the strict liability standard in the con-
text of equality, primarily arguing that “while young men and young
women are dissimilar in their ability to become pregnant, they are
similar in their need for protection by statutory rape laws.”106  For
Jones, the states’ highly gendered—though facially gender neutral—
laws inadequately protect young men from the harm of male victimiza-
tion.  While agreeing with Jones’s equality analysis, I additionally ar-
gue that the law’s invocation of traditional gender roles is destructive
to both men and women by further locking them into stereotypical
roles and interactions.  Courts distort cases by reconfiguring male vic-
tims as dominant and female perpetrators as either passive or devious
(due to their lack of power).  Viewing the male victims as dominant
                                                          
100
Id. at 412.
101
County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 845-46 (Ct.
App. 1996) (agreeing with other cases in which the “economic consequences” to the
father do not override the interest of the child in receiving support).
102
Jones, supra  note 98, at 412-13 (noting that “[b]y imposing financial responsi-
bility to repay state support for an unplanned child,” the law penalizes male statutory
rape victims and fails to protect them from the “potentially substantial harm” caused by
these financial “limitations on their life opportunities”).
103
See ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, ADOLESCENTS, SEX, AND THE LAW:  PREPARING ADO-
LESCENTS FOR RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP 76 (2000) (“[F]or boys, a largely excluded
group from discussions of the negative impact of early sexual activity, research indi-
cates that males pay an emotional price for beginning a sexual relationship early.”).
104
Id. at 439; see also id. at 298 (noting that negative outcomes of teenage child-
bearing “include poorer psychological functioning, lower rates of school completion,
lower levels of marital stability, additional nonmarital births, less stable employment,
greater welfare use, higher rates of poverty, and slightly greater rates of health prob-
lems,” and that “[t]he growing interest in understanding the impact on fathers reveals
that they too become similarly disadvantaged by childrearing and that many of their
disadvantages have roots that led to early parenting”).
105
Jones, supra  note 98, at 439.
106
Id. at 414.
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implies that men are capable of governing themselves, both sexually
and generally, in a way that women are not.  The court in Nathaniel J.
stated that Nathaniel J. was not an “innocent victim” and found the
fact that Nathaniel J. himself described the sexual intercourse as “a
mutually agreeable act” to be relevant to its decision.107  This is an
egregious departure from the well-reasoned policy of statutory rape
laws, which is the protection of vulnerable young people.108
The court ignored the rationale of statutory rape law—that a mi-
nor is not mature enough to make decisions regarding sexual inter-
course—by implying that Nathaniel J. (as a male) was an active agent
in the process and that his female partner could not have been power-
ful enough to have unduly influenced or controlled him.109  As dis-
cussed in the next two Sections, these stereotypes undermine the ide-
als of feminism, work against true gender equality, alienate various
political groups, and add to society’s collective silence regarding male
sexual victimization.
A.  A Critique of the Strict Liability Theory
Both the S.F. and Nathaniel J. courts failed to account for the gen-
der implications of the strict liability standard.  Not only did they fail
to see that the individuals involved were affected differently because
they were male, but they also used language that served to maintain
gender stereotypes about both men and women.  For both of these
reasons—inequality and the furtherance of harmful stereotypes—
feminist thinkers should be concerned about this legal policy.  Some
of the central ideals of feminism regarding reproductive rights are
threatened in these cases and analyzing them in light of feminist
ideals will only enhance flexible and creative advocacy.110
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County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 844 (Ct. App.
1996).
108
See  People v. Paz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166, 168 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussing statutory
rape legislation and noting that the language regarding a ten-year age difference “re-
flects a recognition that a ‘sexually naive’ child of 14 or 15 could fall victim to a more
experienced adult”).  In Paz, the court rejected a defense to statutory rape charges
based on reasonable mistake of age.  Id. at 171.  Interestingly, the Paz court mentioned
a 1964 case that supported the “‘sound policy that it is in the public interest to protect
the sexually naïve female  from exploitation.’”  Id. (quoting People v. Hernandez, 39
Cal. Rptr. 361, 365 (1964)) (emphasis added).
109 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844.
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See supra  notes 11-16 and accompanying text (describing the power of critique
to resuscitate Left movements).
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1.  Male Bodily Integrity
Bodies in general are now understood to be a central aspect of
identity,111 and while the female body has long been studied and ana-
lyzed, many scholars have only recently begun to consider the male
body as both socially constructed and formative for selfhood.112  Much
of this scholarship builds on the ideas of Michel Foucault, who posited
that bodies are historically a site of expression and examination on the
part of liberal society.113  It is clear that the strict liability standard ap-
plied in these cases does not take the male body into account on ei-
ther a basic level (as physically vulnerable and in need of protection)
or as an expression of gender or other form of self-identity.  Before
looking at S.F. and Nathaniel J. in relation to these ideas, it will be
helpful to examine one scholar’s theory on the meaning of bodily in-
tegrity.  Drucilla Cornell offers a powerful feminist argument that
abortion should be treated not as a privacy right, but rather as a right
to “bodily integrity.”114  She uses the psychoanalytic framework devel-
oped by Jacques Lacan to demonstrate that bodily wholeness is essen-
tial to maintaining a basic sense of self in the world.115  She explains
that we form our self-identity by facing our own reflection in a mirror
and imagining that this projection is our true self.  To maintain this
self-identity, we must be able to imagine that this image of ourself will
continue unbroken into the future.116  Turning to the question of
abortion, Cornell argues that banning the procedure is deeply de-
structive of bodily integrity because it separates the woman from her
womb, turning the womb over to the power of the state.117  The woman
becomes unable to imagine herself as a whole individual in the future
                                                          
111
See, e.g., CHRIS SHILLING, THE BODY AND SOCIAL THEORY 1 (1993) (discussing
the increased sociological interest in the body and pointing out that in “conditions of
high modernity, there is a tendency for the body to become increasingly central to the
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See generally  SUSAN BORDO, THE MALE BODY:  A NEW LOOK AT MEN IN PUBLIC
AND IN PRIVATE (1999) (discussing the male body, historically and presently, and how
culture has played a role in defining it).
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FOUCAULT, supra  note 30, at 17-35.
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Drucilla Cornell, Dismembered Selves and Wandering Wombs, in LEFT LEGAL-
ISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra  note 12, at 338.  In a broader context, the Supreme Court
has recognized a limited substantive due process right to bodily integrity:  The “Consti-
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about . . . bodily integrity.”  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
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Cornell, supra  note 114, at 342 (describing Jacques Lacan’s writings based on a
Freudian notion of the “bodily ego”).
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See id. (arguing that the Lacanian framework “allows us to understand just how
fragile the achievement of individuation is”).
117  Id. at 347.
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since she cannot rely on the right to an abortion to prevent this sever-
ing of her body.118
Richard Posner addresses the topic of abortion in Sex and Rea-
son,119 attempting to balance his concern for female bodily integrity
with the life of a fetus.  He asks what a woman loses if “the fetus is ex-
tracted and allowed to live, rather than killed.”120  According to Cor-
nell’s analysis, a woman loses her sense of self because, without the
abortion option, she is forced both into giving birth and into mother-
hood.121  Cornell posits the right to an abortion as the right to prevent
a child from being born.122
It is interesting to then compare S.F., or even Nathaniel J. (if we
understand him as lacking the maturity to make this choice), to a
woman in a parallel position, since both are forced into fatherhood
involuntarily and/or unwillingly.  If the choice to have an abortion is
in part a choice regarding parenthood, then there should also be
some analysis in the context of male choice regarding reproduction
when they could not simply put on a condom and exercise their
choice in the bedroom.  We do not need to devalue the uniqueness of
pregnancy in order to think more critically about male bodies.
Rather, we can apply the ideas developed in the context of female re-
productive rights and use them to problematize the oversimplified
solution of the strict liability approach to child support.  One of the
major problems of the strict liability standard is that it leaves no room
to account for the bodily integrity of a male victim, and without a
more nuanced standard, the courts have no need (or desire) to ad-
dress the issue.  It is then left to feminists and others interested in de-
constructing gender definitions in the law to make some sense of this
balance and to delineate the ways that the ideal of bodily integrity can
be upheld for both men and women.
The first issue S.F. raises is the problem of bodily assault.  Cornell
writes that, “in a case of physical assault, one’s sense of projected unity
is completely shattered.  Physical violence imposes a horrifying dual-
ism of self.  In a violent assault we are reduced to ‘some body’:  as
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Id.  The next step in the analysis is to say that the severing of the female body
effectively places it under male control.  Id. at 347-48.
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See generally  RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 272-90 (1992) (discussing
abortion as a “control of pregnancy” through historical, religious, moral, and statistical
analyses).
120 Id. at 287-88.
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See Cornell, supra note 114, at 363 (“She is forced to give birth and be a
mother.”).
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Id.
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other to our body.”123  While the sexual act in S.F. was not a typical as-
sault (S.F. was unconscious), there was still a violent invasion of his
body.  Upon waking, he must have realized that his body had been
used without his consent or even his awareness; this is an example of a
separation from one’s own body or seeing one’s own body as other
than oneself.  Turning to the sexual nature of this assault, there are
connections between bodily integrity, consent, and sexual autonomy
that have been explored in the context of female victims of sexual
wrongdoings.  Jane Larson, in a feminist analysis of seduction and tort
law, states that, when “sexual consent is coerced, whether by force or
fraud, the result is nonconsensual sex, a moral and physical disposses-
sion of one’s sexual body.”124  Larson begins her argument with “the
premise that sexual fraud leads to nonconsensual sex because it de-
prives the victim of control over her body and denies her meaningful
sexual choice.”125  Thus, the body that is being invaded is a sexual
body, and the necessity for “coherence and self-control”126 is magni-
fied.  Larson then describes autonomy as a feminist value, one that
encompasses “three constituent aspects—bodily integrity, sexual self-
possession, and sexual self-governance.”127  This conception of auton-
omy may thus be seen as expanding and embracing the feminist no-
tion of bodily integrity.  When applied to S.F., it is clear that Larson’s
call for “consent as a means and sexual autonomy as the end of a
feminist sexual politics”128 could aptly be applied to the strict liability
of sperm, at least in cases of male victims of sexual assault.129  The
S.F. court, instead of merely invoking the “legal and moral duty”130 of
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Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 420 (1993).
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Id. at 380.
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Larson, supra  note 124, at 425.
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Larson herself addresses cases involving male plaintiffs.  See id. at 407 (“Surpris-
ingly, although emotionalism is stereotypically associated with women, male plaintiffs
have brought the majority of emotional injury claims in the reported sexual fraud case
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cause of the third-party interests of the child.  See id. at 409 (“In the unwanted parent-
hood cases, courts limit sexual fraud liability to uphold a public policy of protecting
children.”).  I discuss below why this use of the purported interests of the child is itself
problematic.  See infra Part II.B (discussing the conflict between the best interests of the
child standard and the strict liability of sperm).  It would be interesting to see how
Larson would apply her theory of sexual politics to the men in these cases.
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S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
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parents to care for their children, also could have addressed S.F.’s
claims of sexual assault.  By devaluing the significance of the sexual
assault, the court sent the message that it is not willing or able to pro-
tect male sexual autonomy.
Nathaniel J. presents similar questions, and the feminist ideals of
bodily integrity,131 consent, and sexual autonomy lead one to chal-
lenge the applicability of the strict liability theory to statutory rape vic-
tims.  Here the idea of consent is complicated by the fact that the law
does not grant Nathaniel J. the power to consent, yet the court based
his liability at least in part on the fact that he actually agreed to
the sexual relations.132  Britton Guerrina presents the various means by
which statutory rape defendants are able to bring in evidence of a vic-
tim’s sexual history, reputation, and behavior leading up to, and dur-
ing, the act in question.133  The policy goals of statutory rape laws (es-
sentially protecting the victims from themselves, as well as preventing
teenage pregnancy) are supported by evidence that “[y]oung adoles-
cents who engage in sexual activity with adults may experience long-
term emotional scars that impair their sexual and romantic relation-
ships as adults.”134  Guerrina argues that using a female’s aggressive
sexual behavior as a measure of her maturity is antithetical to these
policy concerns135 and improperly diverts the fact-finder’s attention
from the perpetrator’s behavior to that of the victim.136  Further, to
mitigate the punishment for these crimes both encourages this type of
behavior amongst men and reinforces the idea of an “irrepressible
[male] sex drive[]” that is to be tempered by the more chaste sex.137
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As mentioned earlier, the idea of protection for bodily integrity has been sup-
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Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 845 (Ct. App. 1996).
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Id. at 1269.
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preme Court sex discrimination jurisprudence.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent
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2004] STRICT LIABILITY OF CHILD SUPPORT 1981
Notions of male irrepressibility and female chastity are invoked in
Nathaniel J.’s case, in spite of the fact that the female is the perpetra-
tor.138  Here, the court upholds these traditional notions notwithstand-
ing the male gender of the victim by crediting Nathaniel J.’s apparent
desire and discrediting any possible harm to him as an adolescent.
Although Guerrina’s article focuses almost exclusively on female vic-
tims of statutory rape, I argue that a feminist approach to this case
would also find the mention of Nathaniel J.’s willingness and enjoy-
ment of the sexual experience problematic.  The focus clearly was
shifted away from his partner in the sexual act (the perpetrator, ac-
cording to criminal law) to his own conduct.  It is telling that the court
did not discuss the female’s role in the situation, which might have
revealed her power and influence over Nathaniel J.  The idea of the
female sexual aggressor is difficult both for courts (upholding tradi-
tional views) and for many feminist thinkers because it disrupts the
standard conception of gender and power embedded in the work of
such theorists as Catharine MacKinnon.139  Focusing on the victim’s
conduct obscures the fact (perhaps even more obvious in S.F.) that
Nathaniel J., by virtue of his age, was deprived of meaningful consent
and sexual autonomy.
2.  The Fluidity of Masculinity
Just as it is important to apply Guerrina’s ideas to male as well as
female victims, it is important for feminist thinkers to analyze the ways
that these laws maintain stereotypes of both men and women.  The
application of the law indicates static and rigid understandings of
gender and sex, which is contradictory to yet another feminist ideal:
the conception of gender as a fluid and socially constructed cate-
gory.140  Applying this idea to these cases requires an acknowledgment
that masculinity, as well as femininity, is neither monolithic nor
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CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).  MacKinnon’s power/
dominance paradigm is not uncontested by scholars, but it has been highly influential
in the legal world.  She describes her approach to gender and equality as follows:
“Gender is . . . a question of power, specifically of male supremacy and female subor-
dination. . . . Gender might not even code as difference, might not mean distinction
epistemologically, were it not for its consequences for social power.”  Id. at 40.  Her
dominance approach “sees the inequalities of the social world from the standpoint of
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See, e.g., SCOTT, supra  note 7, at 28 (discussing the historical feminist use of the
term “gender” and how it is related to social constructions and power dynamics).
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static.141  Fluidity is a central premise of the developing academic field
of masculinity studies, in which scholars are using various critical ap-
proaches to rethink or expand upon feminist scholarship.142
Susan Bordo’s exploration of the male body in the context of
popular culture provides some useful tools of analysis for the cases at
hand.143  She explains, for example, that boys (and men) that are
abused or embarrassed will “turn to their bodies in an attempt to es-
tablish a private domain in which a sense of control and self-esteem
can be reestablished.”144  Whereas young women often diet to regain
control of their lives (via their bodies), young men very often turn to
bodybuilding.  These activities—both for girls and for boys—are not
merely related to “looking good.”  Rather, they are concerned with
“developing a body that makes one feel safe, respected, in control.”145
This connects directly to the above discussion regarding bodily integ-
rity by illustrating the equal vulnerability of the male body as com-
pared with the female body.  The example of bodybuilding demon-
strates that men also face societal pressures that are then reflected in
their conception of their physical selves.  It follows that male bodies
are just as much in need of legal protection as are female bodies.146
Bordo describes a “double bind of masculinity”147 that our culture
imposes on males.  Males (especially those involved in athletics) are
actively encouraged to be aggressive, but they are also taught that they
are to stop immediately upon hearing the word “no” from a woman.148
                                                          
141 Judith Kegan Gardiner, Introduction to MASCULINITY STUDIES AND FEMINIST
THEORY:  NEW DIRECTIONS 11 ( Judith Kegan Gardiner ed., 2002).  “Feminist-inflected
masculinity studies have reached consensus about some previously troubling issues.
Chief among these is the initial insight that masculinity, too, is a gender and therefore
that men as well as women have undergone historical and cultural processes of gender
formation that distribute power and privilege unevenly.”  Id.
142
See, e.g., ALAN PETERSEN, UNMASKING THE MASCULINE:  ‘MEN’ AND ‘IDENTITY’ IN
A SCEPTICAL AGE 3 (1998) (outlining briefly some of the various critiques of this aca-
demic approach, including strong criticisms from feminists).  Petersen’s starting prem-
ise for his work is that “‘masculinity’ has been essentialised and that this has provided a
major impediment to theoretical and political work.”  Id.
143
See  BORDO, supra  note 112, at 55-59 (connecting, for instance, media stories
about Bill Clinton’s “doughy physique” with a concern that he was “unpresidential” in
contrast to the image of Ronald Reagan on horseback and generally relating physical
fitness with the desire for emotional toughness).
144
Id. at 57.
145
Id.
146
See the discussion of Drucilla Cornell, supra  notes 114-18 and accompanying
text, for a description of the importance of bodily wholeness to developing and pre-
serving self-identity.
147 BORDO, supra  note 112, at 242.
148
Id. at 234.
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The dichotomy is presented as animal versus gentleman, and Bordo
asserts that this is confusing and even paralyzing for men who are try-
ing to form their sexual identity as well as their gender identity.149
This double bind is apparent with the male victims of statutory
rape or sexual assault, a case in which the requirements of aggression
and politeness are complex and often conflicting.  First, there is the
stigma of being a victim (especially in the sexual context), which, sim-
ply by admitting victimization, shows weakness in the male plaintiff.150
But a man may assert this victimization in the guise of a legal defense
(thus making it aggressive rather than passive) against paying child
support for an unintended and unwanted child, placing the emphasis
on the financial aspects and overall unfairness of the situation rather
than on any psychological or emotional harm stemming from the sex-
ual assault.  Men who resist paying child support, however, are then in
danger of being characterized as the “deadbeat dads” (perceived not
only irresponsible but also uncaring)151 against whom the law is really
aimed.  Fathers’ rights groups deal with the question of masculinity in
a careful way, in large part due to this “double bind.”  For example,
the Fathers’ Rights and Equality Exchange (F.R.E.E.) establishes itself
as both assertive (as to legal rights) and compassionate (as to the
plight of single mothers):
To be sure, F.R.E.E. recognizes that there are indeed some fathers who
don’t pay support, or who skip town.  However there are a great many fa-
thers who want to parent their children, who are willing and prepared to
pay their fair share of child-support, and who wish only to be treated with
respect, fairness, and dignity by the State, the Family Law System, and by
society.  It is these fathers for whom F.R.E.E. stands up and advocates.
152
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Groups such as F.R.E.E. seem to be aware of their strange position in a
space both within and between traditional notions of masculinity and
feminism.  F.R.E.E. attempts to navigate the double bind and to ac-
commodate contrasting ideals by simultaneously emphasizing that its
members are good, caring parents to their children, but also that they
are no longer going to be intimidated and are ready to fight back in
the legal arena.153
In addition to examining changing notions of masculinity in cul-
tural or historical terms, some scholars note that a person’s gender
identity also changes over the course of an individual’s lifetime.  Ju-
dith Kegan Gardiner, for example, examines the categories of age and
gender, and asserts that age categories may be useful to depolarize the
typically binary discourse of gender analysis.154  Age categories are con-
tinuous rather than dichotomous, and if imposed on gender catego-
ries, may thus encourage more flexible thinking.155  Age, like gender,
is tied to biological characteristics, but it is also constructed by social
influences and an individual’s reaction to, and incorporation of, such
influences.  Another similarity between the two categories is the com-
plex power dynamic involved, although it may be easier to note differ-
ential power relations in comparing two people at different stages in
life than in the context of gender.156  This is because gender power
differentials are often more contested and more subtle, whereas there
is more general acceptance of the power differentials between chil-
dren and adults, for example.  Feminists are now doing scholarly work
on the developmental stages of female identity,157 and corresponding
(and complementary) work on the development of masculinity in in-
dividuals’ lives would be useful to the critique of the strict liability
standard.  This is especially relevant in the context of the statutory
                                                          
153   See, e.g., Fathers’ Rights & Equality Exchange, Fathers and the Political Process, at
http://www.dadsrights.org/legis.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2004) (acknowledging the
“overwhelming sense of powerlessness” felt by many recently divorced fathers and fo-
cusing on “empowering dads to affect the political process”).
154
Judith Kegan Gardiner, Theorizing Age with Gender:  Bly’s Boys, Feminism, and Ma-
turity Masculinity, in MASCULINITY STUDIES & FEMINIST THEORY:  NEW DIRECTIONS 90,
91 ( Judith Kegan Gardiner ed., 2002).
155 Id. at 94.
156
Gardiner writes that
it is perhaps clearer in the case of age than of gender that the common cate-
gories used to describe them continually slip back and forth between descrip-
tions of typical behavior and prescriptions for how people should be and be-
have, with a wide range of material consequences meted out to those who de-
viate from the behaviors considered proper for each group.
Id. at 97.
157
See id. at 99 (reviewing recent studies).
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rape cases, as this scholarship could produce increasingly subtle think-
ing about male victimization as specific to the age of the victim.  Thus,
if the Nathaniel J. court had considered more seriously the implica-
tions of Nathaniel J.’s age, it might have concluded that his identity as
a male and as a sexual being were at a critical stage of development—a
vulnerable adolescent period requiring legal and other protection.
There is direct evidence of the impact of these ideas on people’s
lives, as seen in the inability of societal institutions to address the
problem of male victims of sexual abuse.  By upholding gendered
stereotypes and ignoring the very real injuries suffered by the male
plaintiffs in these cases, the law is further silencing the already under-
studied problem of sexual abuse of men and boys.  There are several
problems related to the reporting and handling of male sexual vic-
timization, including a fear of stigma (of homosexuality and/or weak-
ness) and the inability or unwillingness of medical centers, law en-
forcement centers, families, and peers to help the victims.158  Even
some rape crisis centers have been unreceptive to helping male vic-
tims of sexual abuse.159  Just as feminists work to actively address the
problems of sexual violence toward females, we cannot blind ourselves
to the damage caused by ignoring male victims.
Another reason to apply feminist ideals to these cases is to
strengthen a political position.  While the fathers’ rights groups may
appear to be on the fringe, they are critical in highlighting the prob-
lems in these cases.  It is ironic that these groups may be able to alert
feminists to the contradictions at hand; perhaps even stranger still is
the fact that feminists may share their ultimate goals.  If feminists are
willing to acknowledge the inadequacy of the current system, space
could be opened up for a coalition encompassing a vast political spec-
trum in its condemnation of traditional thinking.  In the context of
statutory rape, sexual assault, and even contraceptive fraud, address-
ing the problem of strict liability in child support determinations need
not mean abandoning mothers and their children; rather, being open
to questioning these cases and others could serve as a catalyst for re-
thinking the impact of the discourses on both men and women.  At
that point, there would be space for innovative thinking and a deeper
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questioning of the welfare and family law system, questioning that is,
in fact, much needed.160
B.  The Best Interest of the Child and the Strict Liability Theory of Sperm
Both the S.F. and Nathaniel J. courts cited the interest of the child
as the central concern—-an interest that clearly trumped any claims
made by the male victims.161  The concern is not merely financial, but
also seeks to ensure that there are specifically two biological parents
contributing to the child’s needs.  In Nathaniel J., the court noted that
not only is every child entitled to a certain amount of minimum sup-
port, but that this support must come not from one parent, or one
parent and the state, but from both the biological mother and the bio-
logical father.162  This illustrates what has been termed the “two-parent
model,” which is based upon a married heterosexual couple and their
children.163  Through the use of strict liability in both decisions, we see
the court extending this two-parent model to the nonmarital couple
and their child as well.164  Although there are certainly real economic
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App. 1996) (“This State’s interest in requiring minor parents to support their children
overrides the State’s competing interest in protecting juveniles from improvident acts,
even when such acts may include criminal activity on the part of the other parent.”
(quoting State ex. rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 1993))).
162
See  57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844 (“California law provides that every child has a right
to support from both parents.”).
163 See  Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making:  An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 882-89 (2000) (describing a
familial model that is often used to justify public policy).
164
See id. at 886-89 (explaining the broader shifting of this model to the separated
family through initiatives such as parent education programs aimed at divorced cou-
ples).
2004] STRICT LIABILITY OF CHILD SUPPORT 1987
concerns underlying this policy,165 it is based in large part on the belief
that children of single-parent families are worse off in many respects
than their counterparts who have both a mother and a father who are
active participants in their lives.166  There is, in fact, a “growing con-
sensus that it is ‘the right of every child . . . to have the ties of nature
maintained, wherever possible, with the parents who gave it life.’”167
The rhetoric of the “best interest of the child” is certainly compel-
ling, and it is easy to see why policymakers, courts, and theorists often
accept it as the only equitable solution to complicated family situa-
tions.  As many scholars have illustrated, however, on closer examina-
tion this rhetoric proves to be simplistic and even anathema to many
leftist ideals; it is deeply intertwined with conservative moral notions of
family and gender.  Jones discusses the two-parent justification in
terms of the statutory rape cases, and she points out that the source of
the child’s rights in these cases has already been shifted to the state:168
The court is not being asked to render an innocent child destitute.
Thus, the issue in the child support-statutory rape cases is not whether it
is in the best interests of the child to receive financial support from the
biological parent, even though the parent has been sexually victimized.
Rather, the issue is whether it is in the best interests of the child to have
the sexually victimized biological parent reimburse the state for public
funds paid to his child via the AFDC or TANF programs.
169
She concludes that the demand for child support from the father in
these cases can best be characterized as a “proxy for a demand for
greater general parental responsibility.”170
Thus, the state is promoting morality in addition to the child’s
economic well-being through the guise of these child support pay-
ments.  Even though a direct connection between legally enforced
payments and quality parental relationships is tenuous at best,171 this is
                                                          
165 Specifically, a concern for bringing much-needed financial resources to many
low-income single mothers.
166
See  Garrison, supra  note 163, at 887 (citing evidence stating that although be-
ing low-income is the most important factor for the negative consequences faced by
children of single parents, “lower quality parent-child relationships that result from
parental conflict, stress, and absence, also play a role”).
167
Id. at 888 (quoting In re  K., [1990] 1 W.L.R. 431, 437 (C.A. 1990)).
168
Jones, supra  note 98, at 449-50.  The cases often are initiated by the county, not
by the mother, as the county seeks repayment for public benefits distributed to the
mother.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 451.
171
Jones cites research indicating that children may be better situated with two
parents, but then she wonders why the courts in statutory rape cases only require the
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a way for the state to create a marital model where none exists.  Mar-
tha Fineman, a prominent feminist legal scholar, maintains that
“[l]egal attachment of men to women and children is the popular
panacea for many social ills . . . and marriage is seriously offered as the
appropriate social policy.”172  She argues that child support payments
are connected to a belief that the private family unit is capable of solv-
ing such social problems as child poverty (and all of the resulting so-
cial ills that are subsequently traced to child poverty).173  This belief is
based on an assumption that the private family is self-sufficient174 be-
cause the private family envisioned by conservatives is not one that
relies on state support.  Such a family unit is traditional in that it re-
quires a father/husband figure and a mother/wife figure.175  Fineman
                                                                                                                                
father to make monetary payments, but do not address “the child’s legitimate need for
an emotional and physical relationship with the biological father by making custody or
visitation decisions.”  Id. at 452.  She points out that courts can require child support
payments even in cases in which they cannot force the father to uphold other parental
responsibilities.  Id. at 453.  Also, while some studies do show that support payment
leads to more regular visitation, other studies involving unwed fathers “specifically
show that other variables impact whether an unwed father will have a relationship with
his child.”  Id.
172
Martha Albertson Fineman, Child Support is Not the Answer:  The Nature of Depend-
encies and Welfare Reform, in CHILD SUPPORT:  THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 26.  But
cf. Michelle Conlin, UnMarried America, BUS. WK., Oct. 20, 2003, at 106 (citing recent
statistics that indicate that marriage is “on the wane”).  Michelle Conlin’s article cites
the U.S. Census Bureau as showing that married-couple households now make up only
50.7% of the population today, as compared with almost 80% merely fifty years ago.
“Already, unmarrieds make up 42% of the workforce, 40% of home buyers, 35% of
voters, and one of the most potent—if pluralistic—consumer groups on record.”  Id. at
106.  Interestingly, these numbers are counterintuitive to a recent “infatuation” with
the institution of marriage, as seen in the government (Bush’s marriage-promotion
campaign to counteract the rising arguments for gay marriage, for example) and in
popular culture (as in reality television shows based on marriage).  Id. at 106-08.
173
See  Fineman, supra  note 172, at 215 (“As a functional matter, the natural family
is ideally a private family—the social institution that will raise the children . . . .”).
174
Fineman also notes that “[t]he resort to marriage and the traditional family
as a reformist ploy is grounded in the myths of autonomy, independence, and self-
sufficiency that represent ideals for families as well as individuals.”  Id.
175
See id. (“[S]ociety gravitates toward the family populated in traditional form:
husband/father, wife/mother, and dependent/minor children.”).  The tradition of a
male/female-headed household is also reflected in the gay marriage debate.  The dis-
senting opinion in Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health states that “[i]n this Common-
wealth and in this country, the roots of the institution of marriage are deeply set in
history as a civil union between a single man and a single woman.”  798 N.E.2d 941,
977 (Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissenting).  There are also those who would argue that
the traditional heterosexual union is based on more than tradition.  Andrew Koppel-
man analyzes (and rejects) the claims of the “new natural law theorists” who argue that
“marriage is a communion of persons that can only be consummated and actualized
by sexual acts of the reproductive type.”  Andrew Koppelman, Sexual Morality and the
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claims that the private family cannot and should not be held solely
responsible for the care of children and that the problems raised in
connection with child support are linked to the need for broader
changes in society’s conception and treatment of maternity and
work.176  Jones makes a similar point in examining the “private respon-
sibility model of public benefits,” a model that works to maintain the
private family as the source of all child support rather than the state.177
She concludes that even if the system in general is not changed, “a
male statutory rape victim’s status as a victim is a sufficient reason for
the state to bear the cost of supporting a child resulting from statutory
rape.”178  Jones seeks a solution for a discrete issue, and Fineman be-
lieves that the entire system is in need of serious reform.  Through two
separate analyses, both agree that the strict liability standard for child
support and the “best interests of the child” discourse represent some-
thing greater than the actual needs of the child in any given case.
The motivations behind the law—to favor a traditional marital and
parental relationship through its policies—may be impractical,179 but
these motivations are also theoretically problematic for those who do
not fit within this traditional model (such as women who choose to be
single mothers), and even for some who do.  The idea of “responsible
reproduction” is a central theme of the “family-values” discourse (put
forth by conservatives in recent years), and its message is that respon-
sible reproduction occurs within the context of a marriage.180  The
gender stereotyping and categorization that was discussed with regard
to the strict liability standard is present in these underlying policies as
well.  For example, conservatives are disturbed by the idea of women
seeking parenthood without male involvement, and Fineman argues
that there is a resulting “need to ‘discipline’ those women who do not
conform to roles associated with the traditional family but rather live
                                                                                                                                
Possibility of “Same-Sex Marriage”:  Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual? 42 AM. J. JURIS. 51,
52 (1997).
176
See  Fineman, supra  note 172, at 215-20.
177
Jones, supra  note 98, at 454-57.
178
Id. at 456.
179
See supra  notes 166-67 (discussing the use of child support as a means to en-
courage quality relationships and the lack of a connection between making monetary
payments and fostering a parent-child bond).
180
See Fineman, supra  note 172, at 221 (“The message is that responsible repro-
duction . . . occurs only within the context of the traditional family.”); Linda C.
McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 340 (1996) (“The cluster of
behaviors and choices that have been labelled ‘irresponsible’ includes, but is not lim-
ited to, ‘illegitimacy,’ single-parent families, divorce, abortion, and adolescent sexual
activity.”).
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outside the hierarchical, patriarchal family.”181  In the same vein, a
man who does not want to pay child support for a child that is biologi-
cally his (not to mention a man who chooses to resist the marital rela-
tionship) must face charges of being a “deadbeat dad,” the ultimate
irresponsible reproducer.182
The responsible reproduction model also fails to account for the
complex position of marriage today, as it is simultaneously denigrated
and applauded.  No matter which side of the debate one supports, it is
clear that marriage occupies a contested political space in the national
consciousness.183  One of the clearest problems is that lesbian and gay
families, as well as any other nontraditional families, historically have
been excluded legally.184  Susan Apel also paints a dire portrait of the
marriage institution for women, citing the high rates of abuse in mar-
riages as well as economic and legal inequities and the general daily
burdens faced by married women.185  Fineman offers similar evidence,
remarking that the “nature and extent of private violence calls into
                                                          
181 Fineman, supra  note 172, at 221.
182
See  McClain, supra  note 180, at 345 (discussing various models of irresponsible
male reproduction, which include “single fathers,” “deadbeat dads,” and “‘promiscu-
ous’ or ‘predatory’ males”).  While there is great concern over the choices that women
are making, Linda McClain also points out that “some who sound the alarm about
single-parent families perceive the crisis in terms of ‘fatherless America’ and of men’s
abandonment of the role and responsibilities of fatherhood.”  Id. at 341.
183
See, e.g., Conlin, supra  note 172 (exploring the role of marriage in today’s soci-
ety).  The recent debates over gay marriage have only reinforced its tenuous position.
See, e.g., Mehren, supra  note 18 (describing the debate in Massachusetts and how the
court, the legislature, the religious establishment, and the people of Massachusetts are
deeply divided over this issue).
184 The rhetoric of the examined cases endorses not only the notion that the child
deserves support from two parents, but also that these two parents will be of the oppo-
site sex.  For example, the Nathaniel J. court noted that in California “the father and
mother of a child bear ‘equal responsibility’ to support the child.”  Nathaniel J., 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 843, 844 (Ct. App. 1996).  The assumption is that there will always be a man
and a woman who will share parenting duties.  Nontraditional families can respond by
either rejecting this notion (for some of the reasons outlined above) or by trying to
attain access to marital status.  The gay rights community is grappling with this tension,
as advocates for marriage rights within the gay community must justify why marriage is
an institution to which all should aspire.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
recently weighed in on the debate, stating that:
Marriage is a vital social institution.  The exclusive commitment of two indi-
viduals to each other nurtures love and mutual support; it brings stability to
our society.  For those who choose to marry, and for their children, marriage
provides an abundance of legal, financial, and social benefits.  In return it im-
poses weighty legal, financial, and social obligations.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
185
See  Susan B. Apel, Communitarianism and Feminism:  The Case Against the Prefer-
ence for the Two-Parent Family, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 4-19 (1995) (exploring the rea-
sons why marriage is a problematic and even dangerous institution for women).
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question the wisdom of policies designed to coerce women to stay with
male partners to avoid poverty and governmental censure.”186  Mar-
riage also seems to have failed at the one thing that policymakers ex-
pected of it—its role as a stable economic institution capable of sup-
porting its dependents.187  Finally, the most damaging evidence against
marriage for both women and men may be the oft-cited divorce rate
in the country today, indicating that marriage may not prove to be
entirely viable to the very people involved.188  The problems of divorce
and the resulting interests of the children of divorced parents are of-
ten ignored by traditionalists in discussing issues related to child sup-
port because it is easier to focus on the irresponsible reproduction of
illegitimacy.189
Finally, the best interest of the child and underlying responsible
reproduction rhetoric have been challenged at the most basic level,
namely as to whether or not these policies really are best for the chil-
dren themselves.190  Nancy Polikoff, arguing that women should be
free to form families without men, reframes the issue:
[I begin] with the premise that it is no tragedy, either on a national scale
or in an individual family, for children to be raised without fathers.
Children raised without love and guidance, without shelter, nutrition,
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Fineman, supra  note 172, at 216.
187
See id. at 216-17 (“Given a variety of market realities, the breadwinner/house-
wife model is not an institution that can adequately take care of dependency.”).
188
See id. at 216 (“The U.S. Bureau of the Census estimates that half of all mar-
riages entered into since 1970 could end in divorce.”).  A study based on data collected
in 1995 showed that about half of all first marriages end in divorce within twenty years.
MATTHEW D. BRAMLETT & WILLIAM D. MOSHER, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS NO. 323, ADVANCE DATA:  FIRST
MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE:  UNITED STATES 6 (May 31,
2001), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad323.pdf.  But see  Sally C.
Clarke, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Advance Report of Final Divorce
Statistics, 1989 and 1990, 43 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT No. 9, at 9 (Supp.
1995) (showing steady decline in divorce rate since 1981).
189
See  McClain, supra  note 180, at 362-63.  McClain writes that:
One might credibly argue that ‘illegitimacy’ is an easier target than divorce
because the former is viewed as behavior more typical of ‘others’ (namely,
poor people and people of color), while the latter implicates many middle-
class and upper-class American lives (including those of prominent propo-
nents of the attack on ‘illegitimacy’ and welfare dependency).
Id.
190
See  Apel, supra  note 185, at 19-22 (arguing that children may be better off in a
single-parent home rather than in a two-parent home full of conflict and on the verge
of divorce).
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and health care, without meaningful education, without physical safety
in their homes and on their streets—that is tragic.
191
This underscores Marsha Garrison’s assertion that the very real con-
cern of child poverty cannot be solved through the current child sup-
port system:  “Policymakers simply must accept the fact that child sup-
port policy cannot substitute for an antipoverty program.”192
III.  LEAVING BEHIND THE STRICT LIABILITY THEORY:  SOME
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
A.  Applying Theory:  A Call for (Feminist-Led) Action
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that its recent
historic ruling on same-sex marriage “marks a change in the history of
our marriage law.”193  Even the courts, so slow to deviate from the
status quo,194 will facilitate dramatic political and social change when
necessary.195  The battle over same-sex marriage is forcing the legal
system—and the country as a whole—to reevaluate definitions of fam-
ily, as well as of gender, sexuality, and child-rearing.  At the same time,
the late-term abortion issue is mobilizing feminists and the Left to
fight not only this law, but also to counter widely accepted prolife
rhetoric.196  This is a moment for feminists to seize upon such victories
as Lawrence v. Texas197 and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health198 to
force courts to continue to adapt to changing social perceptions.  In
taking these next steps, feminists and Left thinkers have a unique op-
portunity to rethink their positions and assumptions, just as Brown
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Polikoff, supra  note 11, at 375.
192
Garrison, supra  note 26, at 31.
193
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
194
See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980) (“[W]e cannot escape
the reality that the law on occasion adheres to doctrinal concepts long after the rea-
sons which gave them birth have disappeared and after experience suggests the need
for change.”).
195
The San Francisco Superior Court recently did so in refusing to put an imme-
diate end to same-sex marriage licenses being issued in the city.  Murphy, supra  note
18.
196
See supra  note 10 (citing news reports on opposition to the law).
197
See  Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (holding that a Texas stat-
ute criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct was a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
198
See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (concluding that the denial of marriage to
same-sex couples is a violation of the Massachusetts Constitution); see also  Opinions of
the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (advising the legislature that
civil unions would not be sufficient and that full and equal marriage rights are re-
quired by the Massachusetts Constitution).
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and Halley urge us to do.199  It is a chance to look at cases such as S.F.
and Nathaniel J. with a more critical eye and to admit that they are a
problem not so easily resolved.
These are cases in which men were victims of sexual abuse accord-
ing to the law and were then required by the law to provide child sup-
port payments for the child conceived during the incident of abuse.
This is a system that ignores the tremendous impact sexual victimiza-
tion has on an individual’s life.  Its uniformly applied solution of put-
ting the child’s alleged “best interests” above the interests of the male
victim serves to further divert attention from the very issue of the vic-
timization.  The law must be honest in facing the sexual dynamics in
such cases; it must not be allowed to hide behind the rhetoric of pro-
tecting children.  Feminists and others concerned with gender will
have to ensure that the legal system is forced to answer to these
charges and to change.  Feminist thinkers have been successful in
achieving widespread legal change in past decades, and they certainly
have the power to address this issue now.  To concentrate on male
victims is not to abandon feminism; rather it is to take a much-needed
step toward a more effective understanding of equality and sex.
Feminists such as Drucilla Cornell200 articulate the centrality of—
and need for—bodily integrity, and with abortion rights at a critical
juncture, these ideas should be further developed and explored.  If
bodily integrity is an essential value for feminists—which it is and
should be—it must be protected for men as well as for women.  S.F.
was sexually assaulted while unconscious and was deprived of consent
to the sexual and procreative use of his own body.  Nathaniel J. was
only 15 when he impregnated his sexual partner, and, yet, the court
assumed that he had the maturity to consent to sex with a 34-year-old
woman and that he understood the risks that he was taking.  If these
two individuals had been female, the court would most certainly have
treated them differently, in accordance with traditional notions of fe-
male victimization.201  Current understandings of bodily integrity and
sexual autonomy are clearly inadequate to address these cases, as they
focus on the unique nature of the female body.  If we accept the idea
that gender and sexuality are fluid and relational, then legal scholar-
ship and policy on women must also take men into account and not
treated simply as dominant and aggressive.  The male body is also a
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See supra  text accompanying notes 12-14 (characterizing these scholars’ views).
200
See supra  text accompanying notes 114-18 (summarizing Cornell’s analysis).
201
See supra  note 88 (describing how courts treat female victims of sexual assault
more compassionately than they treat male victims).
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site of identity formation, social pressure, and vulnerability, as the still-
growing field of masculinity studies illuminates.202  Feminists and fu-
ture courts will be responsible for repositioning the male body as wor-
thy of discussion and legal protection, just as the long-fought battles
for female equality claim that the female body deserves such attention
and respect.
Critical thinkers cannot simply accept the purported “best inter-
ests of the child”—namely, to be supported financially by both a male
and a female—as an adequate response in all situations.  There is, at
the most basic level, a problem with the court assuming that it can de-
termine a child’s “best interests” while excluding lesbian and gay fami-
lies, deliberately single-parent families, or other nontraditional family
forms.203  Further investigation into the underlying policy of the “best
interests of the child” rhetoric reveals that it is a part of the state’s
continual insistence on a private, marital, heterosexual family unit
that does not require state resources.  Left thinkers must demand
more than this, not only because this is a system that upholds tradi-
tional stereotypes of what is an acceptable family, but also because it
has proven to be an inadequate solution to providing for children and
their caretakers.204  The current debate over marriage and the family
provides a unique opportunity for thinking outside of the traditional
framework.
B.  Possibilities for Change
Martha Fineman has consistently and eloquently highlighted the
problems of current family policy and jurisprudence.205  Her work is
helpful in analyzing many of the issues discussed in this Comment,
and her suggestions for a radical policy change illustrate a willingness
not only to critique, but also to bravely challenge the very basis of the
problem.206  Fineman observes that the sexual connection between
a man and a woman is central to the present notion of family and
that this “horizontally organized intimacy” is in turn connected to an
                                                          
202
See PETERSEN, supra  note 142, at 41-71 (discussing masculinity studies’ scholar-
ship on the male body).
203
Such other nontraditional family forms may include grandparents and other
nonnuclear relatives or other community forms centered around the child.
204
See supra  pp. 1986-92 (arguing that the traditional family model can have a
negative impact on both the child and the parent).
205
See generally  FINEMAN, supra  note 160 (including many of Fineman’s thoughts
and conclusions on this topic).
206
See infra  text accompanying notes 207-12 (describing Fineman’s analysis and
applying her concepts to the cases involving male victims).
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overarching patriarchy currently in place.207  This paradigm of the
family posits men as dominant and marriage as sacred.208  Such a per-
ception is certainly upheld in S.F. and Nathaniel J., as the sexual con-
nection was the basis for the subsequent child support, and the system
requiring this child support was essentially patriarchal in its refusal to
view the father as a victim.  Rather, the courts insisted that the father
retain his rightful place in the family structure by actively contributing
to the care of the child, at least in an economic sense.209  If the male
victim had been relieved of his child-support obligations, the court
would have been aiding in the creation of what Fineman would term a
“deviant,” nonsexual mother/child family.210
Fineman’s critique of the sexual family and the underlying patri-
archal system should be applied to men as well as women.  This system
is damaging to both males and females, as we have seen in the cases of
male victims of sexual crimes.  First, as Fineman points out, a patriar-
chal vision of the family is grounded in stultifying gender stereo-
types.211  Single motherhood is associated not only with immorality,
but with the oft-cited specter of the welfare mother.212  She is the root
of many social problems, ranging from poverty to illiteracy to drugs.213
There are also male stereotypes at work in patriarchy, such as the
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FINEMAN, supra note 160, at 146; see id. at 145 (“The dominant paradigm
 . . . privileges the couple as foundational and fundamental.”).
208 See id. at 146 (describing the male-centered and socially celebrated concept of
marriage).
209
See  S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (“A
father has both a legal and moral duty to support his minor children.”).
210
Fineman writes that family structures that do not fit into the traditional nuclear
model are dismissed and even feared, and that the legal system works actively to up-
hold this traditional model.  See  Fineman, supra  note 172, at 227 (“The current norma-
tive system defines some families as deviant . . . . [meanwhile] the traditional family is
considered so ‘special’ that the state is a necessary partner [in it].”).  Single mothers,
she asserts, are considered to be “deviant.”  See id. at 101-25 (examining the concept in
the contexts of poverty, divorce, and child abuse).  “The impetus for this designation
seems to be that the existence of unstigmatized mothers successfully mothering outside
of the traditional heterosexual family calls into question some of the basic components
of patriarchal ideology.”  Id. at 101; see also CHAMALLAS, supra  note 98, at 282 (analyz-
ing “why single motherhood, despite its prevalence, is treated as suspect, taking as its
framework the triple intersection of race, sex, and class”).
211 See  FINEMAN, supra  note 160, at 146. (recognizing that “horizontally organized
intimacy” is vital to patriarchal ideology).
212
See  CHAMALLAS, supra  note 98, at 281-88 (discussing the intersection of race,
patriarchy, and class in the figure of the “welfare mother”).
213
See id. at 114-15 (describing how political rhetoric ties single motherhood to
these social problems).  It is interesting to then compare the stereotype of the passive
woman present in Nathaniel J. to the image of the “welfare mother,” given that single
mothers in the context of the latter seem to have so much societal control.
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idea—seen in both S.F. and Nathaniel J.—that men are always the sex-
ual aggressors and never the sexual victims.  These rigid ideas con-
tribute to such problems as the “double bind” of masculinity, the ex-
pectation discussed earlier that men be both aggressive and polite.214
There is also the image of the “irresponsible reproducer,” or the
“deadbeat dad,” commonly invoked in political rhetoric and opposed
by the fathers’ rights groups.215  This stereotype serves to make male
victims (already in a position of perceived weakness) look even worse
for not assuming their paternal duties of care.  These images reinforce
the importance of critiquing such cases, as they highlight some of the
ways that legal work is both reflective of, and constitutive of, popular
conceptions.
One of Fineman’s suggestions for change in response to the prob-
lems identified is the “abolition of the legal supports for the sexual
family.”216  This may appear to be extreme and unrealistic,217 yet the
institution of marriage is clearly undergoing serious challenge at the
moment.  Many long-held beliefs are undergoing a transition, and
public discourse is in flux.218  The marital emphasis in the context of
child support should be challenged as a part of the general question-
ing occurring in the legal system.  For one thing, an end to the exclu-
sive legal supports for the sexual family would pave the way for recog-
nizing nontraditional family forms.  Also, this shift in emphasis would
allow courts to address the problems of male victimization, and it
would create room for upholding the ideals of consent, bodily integ-
rity, and sexual autonomy.  By utilizing the strict liability standard in
these cases of male victimization and not requiring a consensual sex-
ual relationship for the sexual family, the legal system ignores the
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See supra  note 148 and accompanying text (discussing how this creates confu-
sion for men trying to form their gender and sexual identities).
215
See supra  notes 151-52 and accompanying text (describing how fathers’ rights
groups seek to portray their members as assertive of their legal rights, yet compassion-
ate to the plight of single mothers).
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FINEMAN, supra  note 160, at 228.  Fineman suggests that contracts between men
and women be entered into outside the context of marriage.  Id. at 229.  She empha-
sizes that she is talking only about the removal of the legal aspects of marriage and that
individuals would be free to ceremoniously indicate their commitment to each other.
Id.
217
Fineman notes that there are already legal supports in place that would make
the implementation of this change less radical.  For example, she discusses antenup-
tual agreements and other contractual commonalities that would simply occur earlier
in the process.  Id.
218 See supra  note 18 (detailing recent debate over gay marriage that implicates
society’s views toward all marriages).
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violations of male bodily integrity and sexual autonomy.219  Refocusing
on the parent-child relationship would bring greater consideration to
the emotional or psychological connection with the child, whereas the
current system privileges the purely biological connection.  When
considering the underlying principles of family law, a voluntary and
healthy connection between a child and her caretaker should be cen-
tral.  The primacy of the sexual relationship between the father and
the mother is also inconsistent in its application to fathers, as illus-
trated by paternity-rights jurisprudence.  In determining a father’s
rights regarding his child, the legal system—and feminists—advocates
the “biology plus” approach that requires the father to demonstrate
some relationship beyond the genetic tie in order to qualify for paren-
tal rights.220  This model and its underlying emphasis on consent and
care should similarly apply in the context of child support, at least in
situations of male victims of sexual assault or statutory rape.
The second suggestion that Fineman offers is the “construction
of protections for the nurturing unit of caretaker and dependant
                                                          
219 The efficiency of the strict liability rule cannot trump the importance of the
individual’s dignity.  The Supreme Court, in another context, has recognized as much.
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(1972) (“[A]ll . . . parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness
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exemplified by the Mother/Child dyad.”221  While creating protections
for the caretaker of a child is a necessary extension of the idea of abol-
ishing legal supports for the sexual family, I would not adopt the
mother/child terminology.  Fineman offers several compelling rea-
sons for employing this gendered model, including a desire to “re-
claim the term” of mother and to convey its metaphoric value for ide-
als of “social and emotional responsibility.”222  She does not deny that
men can be mothers, and she also points out that the term represents
many forms of dependency beyond the actual mother and her child,
including the dependency of the elderly and the disabled.223  In spite
of this, I would use the gender-neutral term “caretaker.”  I would do so
not only because a gender-neutral term is more inclusive of fathers,
but also because it would actively encourage men and women to re-
consider their roles in relation to reproduction, childrearing, and the
family.  As the above analysis has argued, the law in many ways ob-
scures deeper thinking about the formation and portrayal of masculin-
ity today.  Feminists and others should embrace not only gender-
neutral terms like this one, but also the ideals underlying gender-
neutral terminology.  These ideals—which include the conception of
bodies, sex, and gender as vulnerable and ever-changing—may lead to
a radical reconceptualization of the male role in reproduction and
child-rearing and the revitalization of a critique of typical gender
definitions under the law.
CONCLUSION
In the end, S.F. and Nathaniel J. are not merely obscure parties in
some fairly odd cases.  A closer look at these cases reveals that there is
a multi-layered and wide-ranging analysis to be done.  First, these deci-
sions illustrate the extreme consequences of the strict liability stan-
dard for child support, and as such, they are useful border cases that
may serve as starting points for a critique of less-startling fact patterns.
This critique focuses on the language of the opinions, which is
grounded in stereotypical views of both men and women.  Feminist
values, including bodily integrity and fluid conceptions of gender, are
at stake.  The critique also problematizes the best interests of the child
standard, finding that it obscures an underlying conservative vision of
sexuality and the family.
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Fineman, supra  note 172, at 228.
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Id. at 234.
223
See id. at 234-35 (“First, I believe that men can and should be [m]others . . . . 
Second, the [c]hild . . . stands for all forms of inevitable dependency . . . .”).
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Through this process, real problems emerge from these decisions.
The cases implicate the unequal status of women, the lack of political
coalitions on the Left, societal failures regarding male victims of sex-
ual crimes, and a traditional approach to the welfare state.  Martha
Fineman’s scholarship is a good model to use in approaching these
issues, and her critique can then be expanded to include more nu-
anced notions of masculinity.  Her work is also a source of inspiration
for its willingness to advocate radical change to the legal system cur-
rently in place.  The real value of such critique, however, lies not in
the solutions it may find or create, but rather in the process of critiqu-
ing itself.  The method used here looks beyond traditional legal con-
cepts such as equality to engage in theoretical discourse analysis and
to question traditional feminist viewpoints.  The ultimate goal is to
challenge our own notions and expectations and to find new ap-
proaches and tools to use in fighting for change.  Given the current
legal and political climate, this is the perfect moment to use such a
critique and to question it further still.
